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HOW EXISTING SECURITIES LAW AUTHORIZES THE
SEC TO MANDATE AND REGULATE SUSTAINABILITY
REPORTING
Kenya Rothstein†
INTRODUCTION
Today, we face a global climate emergency. This is evidenced
by the countless extreme weather events occurring more
frequently.every year. From heatwaves1 to droughts,2 wildfires,3
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1
US Global Change Research Program, USGCRP Indicators Catalog,
GLOBALCHANGE.GOV (Feb. 8, 2022), https://www.globalchange.gov/
browse/indicators/catalog [hereinafter USGCRP Indicators Catalog] (reporting
under the heat waves indicator that heat waves occur more often than they used
to in major cities across the U.S.— with an average of two (2) heat waves per year
in the 1960s to more than six (6) per year from 2010-2020).
2
Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, Drought and Climate Change,
C2ES.ORG (April 20, 2021), https://www.c2es.org/content/drought-and-climatechange/ (reporting under the drought and Climate Change indica that climate
change increases the odds of worsening drought worldwide in the decades to
come, affecting agriculture production, transportation via waters, increases in
wildfires, and energy supplies).
3
Id.
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floods,4 and storms,5 communities all over the world are
experiencing the detrimental effects of climate change.6 The
catastrophic weather that we have seen across the globe is a
devastating repercussion of climate change.7
The most significant driver of climate change is greenhouse gas8
emissions from human activities.9 Carbon dioxide is a major
greenhouse gas emitted through human activities. The total carbon
emissions from all human activities likely capped off at
approximately 43.1 billion tons in 2019 alone.10 In 2020, due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, carbon emissions went down—but have

4

USGCRP Indicators Catalog, supra note 1 (reporting under the heavy
precipitation indicator that heavy precipitation is more intense and frequent across
the U.S, specifically in the Northeast and Midwest, increasing the risks of floods
and in turn effects on lands and ecosystems).
5
Id. (reporting under the sea level rise indicator how sea level rise affects local
infrastructure and economies in U.S. coastal communities due to tidal flooding
and the effects of increasing storm surges during extreme weather events).
6
CHRISTINE KLEIN, ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: A PLACE-BASED BOOK
OF PROBLEMS AND CASES 741-42 (4th ed. 2018) (summarizing that extreme
weather events have links to climate change and are becoming more catastrophic,
including prolonged periods of heat, heavy downpours, floods, and droughts); see
also US Global Change Research Program, Billion Dollar Disasters
GLOBALCHANGE.GOV (Feb. 8, 2022), https://www.globalchange.gov/browse/
indicator-details/4049 (concluding that the increase in vulnerability to drought,
lengthening wildfire seasons, and potential for extremely heavy rainfall and inland
flooding events are most acutely related to climate change).
7
Id.
8
Env’t. Prot. Agency, Climate Change Indicators: Greenhouse Gases, EPA.GOV
(Feb. 8, 2022) https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/greenhouse-gases#ref1
[hereinafter EPA Climate Change Indicators] (identifying greenhouse gases as
carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and fluorinated gases).
9
Id. (citing Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2013:
The Physical Science Basis, Cambridge University Press (2013) (Feb. 8, 2022)
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/).
10
Chelsea Harvey & Nathaniel Gronewold, Greenhouse gas emissions to set new
record this year, but rate of growth shrinks, SCIENCE.ORG (Dec. 4, 2019),
https://www.science.org/content/article/greenhouse-gas-emissions-year-set-newrecord-rate-growth-shrinks.
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begun to pick back up again.11 The main human activity that emits
carbon dioxide is the combustion of fossil fuels (coal, natural gas,
and oil) for energy and transportation.12 Carbon major
corporations—which are the producers of oil, natural gas, coal, and
cement—are responsible for over 30% of global industrial
greenhouse gas emissions.13 While carbon major corporations carry
a large responsibility for climate change, every corporation has an
impact on climate change.
Climate change affects corporations too.14 Increases in severity
of weather and climate can impact corporations’ productivity.15
Physical and market transitions associated with climate change also
have impacts on corporations’ bottom line.16
Corporations basically produce everything that we use in our
daily lives. We are inextricably tied to a world that requires
corporations to mass produce, to coordinate same day deliveries,
and to be reliable for the everyday needs of society. It is vital that
we live in a world where the United Nations’ definition of
sustainability is true, that we “[meet] the needs of the present

11

Jeff Tollefson, COVID curbed carbon emissions in 2020—but not by much,
NATURE.COM (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-02100090-3.
12
Carbon Disclosure Project, CDP Majors Report 2017, THE CARBON MAJORS
DATABASE
(Feb.
8,
2022),
https://cdn.cdp.net/cdp-production/cms/
reports/documents/000/002/327/original/Carbon-Majors-Report2017.pdf?15018
33772.
13
Lisa Benjamin, The Responsibilities of Carbon Major Companies: Are They
(and Is the Law) Doing Enough, 5 TRANSNATIONAL ENV’T. L. 353-378, (2016)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/transnational-environmentallaw/article/responsibilities-of-carbon-major-companies-are-they-and-is-the-lawdoing-enough/A4835364B014F57F61F0E5196485412C.
14
Tyson Dyck & Henry Ren, ESG and Climate Change, TORYS LLP (March 23,
2021),
https://www.torys.com/Our%20Latest%20Thinking/
Publications//2021/03/esg-and-climate-change/ (reviewing S&P Global Market
Intelligence data revealing that 80% of the world's largest companies report
exposure to physical or market transition risks connected to climate change).
15
Id.
16
Id.
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without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs.”17
So, how can corporations exist profitably and in the long-term,
provide for society, and mitigate their impact on Climate Change
all at the same time? In this article, I argue that the answer to this
question, in part, is through mandated and regulated sustainability
reporting by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).
Sustainability reporting has two distinct but related objectives:
one inward directed and the other outward. The purpose of
sustainability reporting, inwardly, is to help corporations manage
change more efficiently18 (i.e., economic changes as it relates to a
company’s sustainable developments19). In addition, sustainability
reporting helps corporations measure, understand, and communicate
their financial and ESG performance.20 A company’s ESG
performance includes environmental, social and governance factors,
which are used by investors (and other stakeholders) to evaluate a
company’s sustainability performance in connection with its
financial performance.21 Environmental factors include data on a
company’s waste management practices, energy efficiency, and

17

United
Nations,
Sustainability,
UN.ORG
(Feb.
8,
2022)
https://www.un.org/dgacm/en/content/editorial-manual/abbreviations
18
Carmela Gulluscio, et. al. Climate Change Accounting and Reporting: A
Systematic Literature Review, 12 Sustainability 20 (July 2020) (summarizing that
Climate Change adaptation is necessary for the following: developing business
strategies and managing risk; understanding climate change impacts on
infrastructure and supply chains; protecting reputational; addressing legal
concerns; and complying with regulations).
19
Ileana M. Porras, The City and International Law: In Pursuit of Sustainable
Development, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 538, 585 (2009) (explaining that sustainable
development “requires attention to the competing values of economic
development, environmental protection and equity (social development)”).
20
Seleshi Sisaye et al. TMQ and Sustainability Reporting, Internal Auditing,
WARREN, GORHAM & LAMONT (2004) 2004 WL 3158382 [hereinafter TMQ and
Sustainability Reporting] (discussing sustainability reporting as a basic
management strategy).
21
Robeco, What is ESG? Sustainable Investing Glossary, ROBECO.COM (Feb. 8,
2022),
https://www.robeco.com/en/key-strengths/sustainableinvesting
/glossary/esg-definition.html.
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contribution to climate change through greenhouse gas emissions.22
Social factors include human rights disclosures, supply chain labor
standards, exposure to illegal child labor, and compliance with
workplace health and safety regulations.23 Governance means the
corporate governance system that is used to reconcile interests
between stakeholders and how it is used as a tool to support a
company’s long-term strategy.24
The purpose of sustainability reporting, outwardly, is for
corporations to share with shareholders and investors their ESG
performance data and goals.25 Sustainability reporting also serves as
a way for corporations to provide sustainable disclosures, which
includes their climate data and risks, and how they plan to address
such variables to investors and shareholders. To summarize, the
information provided in a sustainability report may be referred to as
ESG performance, sustainable development information,
sustainable disclosures, climate disclosures, and environmental
risks, to name a few—I will use these terms throughout this article.
Investors think sustainability reporting is important to their
investment decisions.26 In this article, I discuss how investors have
been pushing for accurate and reliable sustainability reporting as
evidenced by petitioning the SEC, bringing shareholder litigation
against issuing companies regarding climate disclosures, and raising
22

Id.
Id.
24
Id.
25
Nancy S. Cleveland et al., Sustainability Reporting: The Lawyer's Response,
BUS. L. TODAY 1, 2 (2015) (prefacing that sustainability reporting serves the
needs and interests of a wide and growing variety of stakeholders, including
investors); TMQ and Sustainability Reporting, supra note 20 (defining
“sustainability reporting” as reporting that provides more than financial numbers
and focuses on quality of operational issues, for example environmental
performance).
26
Ariel C. Pinchot & Giulia Christianson, What investors actually want from
sustainability data, GREENBIZ.COM (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.
greenbiz.com/article/what-investors-actually-want-sustainability-data
(summarizing a survey where the authors concluded that more investors are
pursuing strategies that consider relevant environmental, social and governance
(ESG) factors).
23
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shareholder proposals regarding ESG performance. These efforts
reveal the importance of sustainability reporting to investors.
In response to investor interest in sustainability reporting,
companies have been finding ways to present this information to
investors and shareholders. 27 In a recent study by the Harvard
Business Review, seventy senior executives at forty-three global
institutional investing firms—including CalSTRS, one of the most
influential firms when it comes to corporate change because of its
mere size—found that ESG was at the forefront of the executives’
minds.28 Most companies produce voluntary sustainability reports—
seventy-eight percent of the S&P 500 issued a sustainability report,
most with environmental metrics.29
However, I assert that voluntary sustainability reporting is not
reliable. Voluntary reporting does not produce an accurate snapshot
of a company’s sustainability performance. Because there is no
uniformity in reporting, it is difficult to compare reports of different
companies. There is limited third-party assurance that the
sustainability reports are accurate. In the instances where there is
27

Governance and Accounting Institute, G&A Institute’s 2020 Research Report
Shows 65% of Russell 1000® Published Sustainability Reports in 2019, Up From
(Oct.
26,
2020),
60%
in
2018,
GLOBENEWSWIRE
https://www.globenewswire.com/en/news-release/2020/10/26/2114424/0/en/GA-Institute-s-2020-Research-Report-Shows-65-of-Russell-1000-PublishedSustainability-Reports-in-2019-Up-From-60-in-2018.html (reporting that in 2019
the Governance and Accounting Institute (G&A) determined that 90% of
companies in the S&P 500 were publishing a sustainability report).
28
Robert G. Eccles & Svetlana Klimenko, The Investor Revolution, HARV. BUS.
(May-June 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/05/the-investor-revolution
REV.
(explaining that executives from top investment firms are thinking about ESG
performance in their decision making process, including executives from
BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street, and asset owners from CalPERS, and
CALSTRS, as well as government pension funds in Japan, Sweden); see also
Thomson Reuters Tax and Accounting, Sustainability Reporting Gains
Momentum, 5 WGL ACCT. ALERT 1 (explaining that auditors see a growing
practice area in helping clients properly connect environmental performance to
financial results).
29
John Lukomnik, State of Integrated and Sustainability Reporting 2018,
INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH INSTITUTE (Dec. 3, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/12/03/state-of-integrated-andsustainability-reporting-2018/.
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third-party assurance, it is rarely helpful to the investor due to the
lack of mandated standards. Voluntary sustainability reporting also
lacks enforceability, which is an essential aspect of reliable
reporting. The shortcomings of voluntary sustainability reporting
evidence the need for it being mandated and regulated.
SEC mandate and regulation of sustainability reporting fits into
the existing legal structure of securities law. First, the decision to
provide investors and shareholders with information has already
been made.30 Securities law was developed to protect investors by
providing them with accurate and reliable information about
publicly traded companies. The information provided in a
sustainability report provides investors with a fuller picture of a
company, which they need in order to make sound investments.
Second, the SEC has the authority under securities law to mandate
and enforce financial accounting and reporting standards created by
industry professionals, as seen in its ratification of FASB. Therefore,
the SEC has the authority to ratify and enforce sustainability
accounting and reporting standards already created by industry
professionals. Third, securities law regulates “material”
disclosures31 through informational regulation.32 The definition of
materiality is based on what the reasonable investor determines to
be material.33 Investors are requesting the material information that
is provided in a sustainability report. Material sustainable
information include risks associated with the transition to a lower
carbon economy, litigation, technology, market changes,
30

Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation As Environmental Law, 71 STAN.
L. REV. 137, 165 (2019) (explaining that the purpose of U.S. securities laws is to
provide information to investors concerning securities offered for sale to the
public and to protect investors from manipulation of stock prices).
31
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (defining an omitted
fact as being material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder or investor would consider it important in deciding how to vote, this
was the first major Supreme Court case to define materiality); see also infra notes
65-72 and accompanying text discussing materiality.
32
Light, supra note 31, at 165 (2019) (explaining that securities law provides
information to investors and regulates market integrity largely through
informational regulation).
33
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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reputational risk from bad publicity, and impacts of extreme weather
on their supply chains.34 This evidences that investors find this
information material.
This article is structured as follows: Part I describes the
importance of investor and shareholder access to accurate and
reliable material information so they can make sound investments
decisions. Thereby, illustrating that by the SEC mandating and
regulating sustainability reporting, it will protect investors because
the risks and factors that go into a sustainability report are
“material,” and therefore, are already in fact required. This part of
the article considers the current situation of voluntary reporting and
identifies its limitations. Based on securities laws and the limitations
of voluntary sustainability reporting, I conclude that SEC mandate
and regulation of sustainability reporting is the way to go. Part II
uses the fact that shareholders are raising litigation and proposals
regarding sustainable disclosures as evidence that investors find this
information material. I use the Exxon and PG&E shareholder
litigations to provide accounts of how shareholders are demanding
accurate and reliable climate disclosures. I go through several
shareholder proposals to evidence that the information shareholders
are requesting via their proposals is the type of information provided
in a sustainability report. I argue that the next step is for the SEC to
mandate, regulate, and enforce sustainability reporting. Part III goes
into the public policy benefits of mandating and regulating
sustainability reporting, that it provides incentives for companies to
engage in better environmental practices and can have a potentially
enormous effect in mitigating climate change.
I. IMPORTANCE OF INVESTOR AND SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO
RELIABLE AND ACCURATE INFORMATION ABOUT PUBLICLY
TRADED COMPANIES
In this part of the article, I assert that the SEC mandating
sustainability reporting will protect investors. Sustainability
34
Lisa Benjamin, The Road to Paris Runs Through Delaware: Climate Litigation
and Directors’ Duties, 2020 UTAH L. REV. 313, 319 (2020).
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reporting provides investors with information that securities law
deems necessary. SEC mandate and regulation of sustainability
reporting will provide safeguards necessary to ensure the accuracy,
reliability, and overall effectiveness of this type of reporting.
Mandated sustainability reporting prevails where voluntary
sustainability reporting fails. Voluntary sustainability reporting does
not provide investors with accurate or reliable information that is
sufficient to use for making investment decisions. The SEC’s
limited guidance on sustainable disclosures has not been enough to
overcome the hurdles investors face with voluntary sustainability
reporting. The next step is for the SEC to mandate and regulate
sustainability reporting.
1.

Securities Law was Developed to Protect Investors

This section starts off by laying out the history of securities law.
I use this history as a road map to show how sustainability reporting
can be mandated by the SEC under existing securities law. First, the
SEC has the authority to designate accounting standard setters and
to ratify their standards—which I argue the SEC should do for
sustainability accounting and reporting standards. Second, SEC
oversight of independent auditing of financial statements is an
important element on ensuring disclosures are accurate and true;
similarly, the SEC should regulate an auditing scheme for
sustainability reporting. Third, accountability of auditors and
executives is an essential factor that incentivizes accurate and
reliable reporting, which sustainability reporting lacks and needs.
Fourth, sustainable disclosures are material disclosures; and
material disclosures are already required under securities law to be
reported on. These four elements lay the foundation for how the SEC
can mandate and regulate sustainability reporting under the
securities law regime.

10
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A Brief History of Securities Law

Securities law was created to protect investors.35 One of
Congress’ firsts steps toward protecting investors is by way of the
Securities Act of 1933 (“the Securities Act”).36 This act was enacted
to protect the investing public and maintain honest businesses.37 The
purpose of this act is to ensure that investors are informed of the
facts concerning the sale of securities, as well as protected against
fraud and misrepresentation.38 Then, Congress enacted the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (“The Exchange Act”),39
which aimed to further protect investors against manipulation of
stock prices.40 It was under The Exchange Act that the SEC was
created, the federal agency whose mission is to “protect investors,
maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital
formation.”41
35
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Role of the SEC, INVESTOR.GOV (Feb. 8, 2022)
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/role-sec
(explaining that the purposes of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act can be
reduced to two (2) common-sense notions: companies offering securities for sale
to the public must tell the truth about their business, the securities they are selling,
and the risks involved in investing in those securities; and those who sell and trade
securities –brokers, dealers, and exchanges –must treat investors fairly and
honestly).
36
Sec. Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (1934)
37
Darla M. Fera, ¶ 113 Securities Act Of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 2018 WL 7983062 (summarizing how the Securities Act requires the
registration of all public offerings of securities and how it creates express private
rights of action for damages resulting from misstatements in required documents).
38
Charles W. Murdock, 8 Ill. Prac. Series Bus. Orgs., The Securities Act of 1933
§ 15:2 (2021).
39
15 U.S.C. § 78A.
40
Fera, supra note 37 (explaining how the Exchange Act regulates market
participants, including large public issuers, institutional investment managers,
underwriters, broker-dealers, exchanges, transfer agents, and securities clearing
agencies in part to protect against stock price manipulation).
41
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Role of the SEC, INVESTOR.GOV (Feb. 8, 2022)
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/role-sec
(listing the quote as the mission of the SEC on its website); see also Robyn
Bishop, Investing in the Future: Why the Sec Should Require A Uniform Climate
Change Disclosure Framework to Protect Investors and Mitigate U.S. Financial
Instability, 48 ENV’T. L. 491, 494 (2018).
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To protect investors, Congress promulgated disclosure
requirements for publicly traded companies. The Securities Act
prescribed regulation S-K42 in an effort to “streamline the
preparation of disclosure documents.” 43 Regulation S-K is the
“central repository for corporate disclosure to investors,” which
ensures investors can make informed voting and investment
decisions.44 A key component of regulation S-K is to “assure
uniform information for investors and other information users.”45
Under both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, Congress
delegated the establishment of uniform financial accounting and
reporting standards to the SEC, granting it authority to
develop standards for publicly traded companies.46 However, the
SEC turned to accounting professionals to develop accounting
principles and standards.47 In 1973, in Accounting Series Release
No. 150,48 the Commission stated “standards and practices
promulgated by the [Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB)] in its Statements and Interpretations will be considered by
the Commission as having substantial authoritative support, and
those contrary to such FASB promulgations will be considered to
have no such support.”49 FASB has since been recognized by the
42

17 C.F.R. § 229
Kara M. Stein, Statement at Open Meeting on a Concept Release on the
Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, SEC. AND EXCH.
COMM’N (April 13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/stein-statement1-041316.html#_ftn2 (citing Adoption of Disclosure
Regulation
and
Amendments of Disclosure Forms and Rules, Release No. 33-5893 (Dec. 23,
1977)).
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Andreas M. Fleckner, Fasb and Iasb: Dependence Despite Independence, 3 VA.
L. & BUS. REV. 275, 284 (2008) (citing 15 U.S.C.§77s(a), 15U.S.C.§ 78m(b),
15U.S.C.§78c(b)).
47
Id.; J. Lynn Taylor, Policy Statement: Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a
Designated Private-Sector Standard Setter, SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (April 25,
2003), https://www.sec.gov/rules/policy/33-8221.htm.
48
George A. Fitzsimmons, Statement of Policy on the Establishment &
Improvement of Accounting Principles & Standards, Release No. AS-150 (Dec.
20, 1973).
49
Id.; see also Fleckner, supra note 46, at 285.
43
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SEC as the designated accounting standard setter for public
companies.50 It develops and issues financial accounting standards
through a transparent and inclusive process intended to promote
financial reporting that provides useful information to investors and
others stakeholders.51 The SEC, then, enforces these accounting and
auditing standards.52
In 2002, federal lawmakers under the Bush administration
enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).53 This legislature was in
response to corporate scandals defrauding investors (e.g. Enron and
Worldcom).54 The act was an attempt to restores investor confidence
in financial markets and deter companies from defrauding
investors—and investor fear of this happening—by providing
further assurance that the information investors are receiving is
accurate.55 One way to restore investor confidence is through section
404(a) of the SOX, which requires companies reporting under the
Exchange Act to include in one of their mandated reports an analysis
from management on the effectiveness of the company's internal
accounting and financial controls—to ensure that the report is true
and not misleading.56
The SOX adds an additional layer of protection by strengthening
the independence of accounting firms that audit public companies.57
50

Financial Accounting Standards Board, About the FASB, FASB.ORG (July
2020), https://www.fasb.org/info/facts.
51
Id.
52
Id. (explaining that FASB's rules are enforced by one single agency, the
Securities and Exchange Commission).
53
Legal Malpractice, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Introduction § 13:160
(2021) (explaining that Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in response to
the high profile, accounting-related frauds involving major corporations in
America, which were discovered between 1999-2002).
54
Cristina Michelle De Celestino, Krispy Kreme, Sarbanes-Oxley, and Corporate
Greed, 15 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 225 (2007).
55
Id.
56
24A William M. Prifti, Securities: Pub. & Priv. Offerings, Section 404
Compliance under Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 § 7:63 (2020).
57
Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Lawyer Professional
Responsibility, and a Heightened Role for Business Lawyers, 11 NEV. L. REV. 8,
9 (2003) (outlining the numerous sections of the SOX that regulate the
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Title I of the SOX creates a Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB) that is overseen by the SEC.58 PCAOB is the
principal U.S. regulator that oversees the audits of public companies
and SEC-registered brokers and dealers.59 Section 404(b) of the
SOX requires public auditors to attest to the company's management
and internal controls effectiveness.60 Auditors provide an additional
layer of assuredness to investors that the information being
disclosed is accurate and true.
CEO and CFOs are held liable under the SOX for
misinformation provided in financial reports that they have
certified.61 A few sections of the SOX regarding penalties for
misinformation include sections 807 and 906. Under Section 807 of
the SOX, companies and individuals who defraud shareholders are
subject to criminal penalties.62 Additionally, CEOs are held
responsible for the content of their financial reports, and they can
face potential fines of up to $5 million and imprisonment of twenty
years for willful false certification of financial reports under Section
906.63 Requiring attestation from auditors and executives of
companies holds them accountable for providing misinformation in
the required reports under securities laws. This accountability
independent auditing aspect of the Act); BUS. LAWS INC., EXECUTIVE LEGAL
SUMMARY 376 (2020) [hereinafter EXECLSUM 376].
58
Stempel, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Lawyer Professional Responsibility, 11 NEV.
L. REV. at 9 (citing Sections 101 and 106 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
59
Jay Clayton, Statement on the Vital Role of Audit Quality and Regulatory Access
to Audit and Other Information Internationally—Discussion of Current
Information Access Challenges with Respect to U.S.-listed Companies with
Significant Operations in China, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (December 7, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-vital-role-audit- qualityand-regulatory-access-audit-and-other#:~:text=The%20SEC%20oversee
s
%20the%20PCAOB,SEC%2Dregistered%20brokers%20and%20dealers.
60
24A William M. Prifti, Securities: Pub. & Priv. Offerings, Section 404
Compliance under Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 § 7:63 (2020).
61
Aulana Peters, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Congress' Response to Corporate
Scandals: Will the New Rules Guarantee "Good" Governance and Avoid Future
Scandals, 28 NOVA L. REV. 283, 286 (2004).
62
Stempel, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Lawyer Professional Responsibility, 11 NEV.
L. REV. at 11.
63
Id.
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function is important in the effectiveness of reports containing
accurate and reliable information because it increases the
responsibility of management for public companies' financial and
corporate disclosures.64
B.

Materiality

Materiality is a term of art that has been developed under
securities law. The Supreme Court has held that a fact is material if
there is a “substantial likelihood” that a reasonable investor would
view it as “significantly alter[ing] the ‘total mix”’ of available
information.65 Whether leading to a positive or negative impact on
a company, material information can include demands,
commitments, events, and uncertainties.66 More specifically,
material information may also include contracts the company has
entered into, legal proceedings, risks the company is facing,
executives compensation, and historical information.67
There are several types of reports that registered companies have
to issue to ensure investors have access to the company’s material
information. The main reports include a 10Q, 10-K, and 8-K. A 10Q
is a report that is submitted quarterly about a company’s financial
performance.68 A 10-K Annual Report contains an annual snapshot
of a company, and requires the company to disclose material
information and risks to investors.69 The Management Discussion
and Analysis (MD&A) is part of the 10-Q or 10-K annual report; it
requires the executives to analyze the company’s financial condition
64

EXECLSUM 376, supra note 57.
Kurt S. Schulzke & Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, Toward A Unified Theory of
Materiality in Securities Law, 56 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 6, 9 (2017) (citing
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976)).
66
George S. Georgiev, Too Big to Disclose: Firm Size and Materiality Blindspots
in Securities Regulation, 64 UCLA L. REV. 602, 617 (2017).
67
Id.
68
Thomson Reuters Tax and Accounting, 1.313: Form 10-Q: Financial
Information, 2003 WL 21375951.
69
Robyn Bishop, Investing in the Future: Why the SEC Should Require A Uniform
Climate Change Disclosure Framework to Protect Investors and Mitigate U.S.
Financial Instability, 48 ENV’T. L. 491, 494 (2018).
65
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and operations of the registrant.70 The MD&A includes a discussion
of compliance, risks, future plans, goals, and projects.71 An 8-K calls
for “rapid and current disclosure” of material information by
reporting companies.72 This means that 8-K reports can be produced
at any time whenever a material change happens that investors and
shareholders should be made aware of. Overall, securities law
makes sure that investors have access to accurate and reliable reports
that contain the material information necessary to make sound
investments.
C.

Sustainability Reporting Fits Within Existing
Securities Law

I assert that by mandating sustainability reporting, the SEC will
protect investors—as it is directed to do under securities law.73
Having access to accurate and reliable sustainability reports will
ensure that investors are informed of the facts concerning the sale of
securities, and are protected against fraud and misrepresentations,
which is the purpose of the Securities Act.74
Voluntary sustainability reports do not meet this investor
protection threshold that securities law deems to be the backbone of

70

Brent A. Olson, Publicly Traded Corporations Handbook, MD&A—Item 303 of
Regulation S-K § 6:20 (2020).
71
Id. (explaining that the MD&A focuses on material events and uncertainties
management knows that would affect but not necessarily be indicative of the
future financial condition, including descriptions and amounts of (A) matters that
would have an impact on future operations and have not had an impact in the past,
and (B) matters that have had an impact on reported operations and are not
expected to have an impact upon future operations); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n,
Financial Reporting Manual-Topic 9- Management’s Discussion and analysis of
Financial Position and Results of Operations (MD&A), SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N
(May 11, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/cf-manual/topic-9 (explaining that
the MD&A is a portion of a public company's annual report or quarterly filing,
where management addresses the company's performance and provides a
discussion of topics like risks and future plans).
72
Roy Smith, Changes to the Securities and Exchange Commission's Form 8-K,
24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 216, 216 (2005).
73
See text accompanying notes 35-64, supra.
74
See text accompanying notes note 40, supra.
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its efforts.75 The lack of accountability and assurance of voluntary
sustainability reporting paints an inaccurate and incomplete picture,
weakening their reliability. Additionally, voluntary reporting is not
uniform, making voluntary reports difficult for investors to
compare.
The SEC has the authority to mandate financial accounting and
reporting standards created via industry professionals.76 Like it did
with the FASB, the SEC should endorse and enforce sustainability
accounting and reporting standards created by industry
professionals.77 Furthermore, mandating standard sustainability
accounting and reporting standards is in line with regulation S-K
because it would “assure uniform information for investors and
other information users.”78
To ensure the highest protection to investors, mandating
sustainability reporting should also include an independent auditing
requirement of reports. The Enron and Worldcom scandals evidence
what can happen when companies lack accountability and
independent auditing—companies potentially defrauding investors.
The SEC already has the authority to oversee auditing under the
SOX.79
Ensuring company liability for false information is essential to
guaranteeing that reports are accurate and reliable. Having
executives sign off, and in turn, face potential personal liability for
inaccurate information would reassure an honest effort to make
sustainability reports accurate and true. This is already a
requirement under securities law80 and should be enforced for
sustainability reporting as well.
The good news is that sustainability reporting is not a new topic;
so, the SEC does not have to start from scratch. Executives have
already been thinking about sustainability reporting and how to
75

See text accompanying notes 35-64 supra.
See text accompanying notes 46-52 supra.
77
See text accompanying notes 98-111 infra (discussing the various sustainability
accounting and reporting standards created by industry professionals).
78
See supra note 43.
79
See text accompanying notes 57-60 supra.
80
See text accompanying notes 61-64 supra.
76
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implement it.81 Numerous sustainability accounting and reporting
standards have been created and used by companies around the
world.82 But now, reporting companies need to be mandated and
regulated by the SEC in their production of sustainability reports,
and investors need assurance that they have access to reliable and
accurate information that gives them a full picture of company’s
performance. Through stakeholder input, community engagement,
and requests for public comments, the SEC can find an effective way
for reporting companies to communicate accurate, decision-useful
sustainable disclosures to investors.83 The public has done all it can
on its own with voluntary sustainability reporting, now it needs the
SEC to step in.
D.

Sustainability Disclosures are Material to
Investors

The information provided in a sustainability report is material
because it has a direct effect on a company’s bottom line and
investors are requesting it in order to make sound investment
decisions. For example, climate change will impact businesses in
material ways, and companies should be sharing with investors how
they are addressing their climate risks.84 Investors are requesting
disclosures regarding climate risks.85 Climate risks include: shifts to
clean energy, which could lead to changes in the future value of a
company’s assets or production; financial instability for certain
industries like banking, insurance, and fossil fuel productions;86

81

See text accompanying note 28 supra.
See text accompanying notes 98-111 infra (discussing the various sustainability
accounting and reporting standards created by industry professionals).
83
Robyn Bishop, Investing in the Future: Why the Sec Should Require A Uniform
Climate Change Disclosure Framework to Protect Investors and Mitigate U.S.
Financial Instability, 48 ENV’T L. 491, 493 (2018).
84
Id. at 497.
85
Shareholders request of climate disclosures is discussed in more depth in
Section II of this article.
86
Bishop, Investing in the Future, 48 ENV’T L. 491 at 497.
82
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interruptions to the operation of businesses87 by way of fires or
severe storms; and the inherent risks of increasingly restrictive
environmental regulations that could materially impact the
company’s results of operations or financial condition.88 Climate
change can also have a positive impact on certain industries that are
involved in agricultural biotech, energy efficient production, and
desalination, to name a few.89 Whether it is good or bad news,
sustainable disclosures are material information that needs to be
disclosed to investors because it lets them know how a company’s
ESG performance affects its financial performance.
There are several ways a sustainability report can be presented
to investors and shareholders: as part of the MD&A, standalone, or
integrated into the financial reports, to name a few. A more nuanced
approach is through a Sustainable Development Analysis
(“SD&A”), modeled after the MD&A.90 This analysis would require
a disclosure and discussion of a corporation’s specific known or
reasonably knowable sustainability issues and the effects on
economic performance.91 Analogous to the MD&A, the SD&A
disclosure would be based on known risks, trends, and opportunities
that are material to the issuers' business plan or operations.92
The varied effects of climate change on and varied ESG
performance by different industries demonstrates the need for
mandated and regulated sustainability accounting and reporting

87

Apple
Inc.,
Annual
Report,
APPLE,
at
15
(2016),
https://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/AnnualReportArchive/aNASDAQ_
AAPL_2017.pdf (listing interruptions to the operation of business in its annual
report).
88
Chevron, Annual Report, CHEVRON, at 43 (2018), https://www.chevron.com//media/chevron/annual-report/2018/documents/2018-Annual-Report.pdr (listing
environmental regulations that could materially impact the company’s results of
operation or financial condition in its annual report).
89
Bishop, supra note 84, at 497.
90
Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO. L.J. 923,
956 (2019).
91
Id.
92
Id.

2021-22]

REGULATE SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING

19

standards that convey accurate, comprehensive, and decision-useful
sustainable risk information to investors and shareholders.93
2.

Mandating and Regulating Sustainability Reporting
Will Protect Investors

Voluntary sustainability reporting is not sufficient to ensure
investors have access to the accurate and reliable material
information that they need to make investment choices; this is why
the SEC should step in and mandate and regulate sustainability
reporting. Voluntary sustainability reports are subpar in providing
investors with accurate information due to skewed representations.
Despite there being a series of competing sustainability and
reporting standards that are used sporadically in voluntary
sustainability reports, the lack of uniformity in the standards makes
it difficult for investors to compare reports. Without auditing from
independent auditors, voluntary sustainability reports lack that
additional layer of reassurance that mandated reports have under the
SOX. The limits of voluntary sustainability reporting are felt by
investors, as they have continued to petition the SEC for better
reporting schemes regarding sustainability disclosures. The SEC’s
responses over the years to these requests have not provided an
adequate framework for investors to be protected. The SEC needs to
mandate and regulate sustainability reporting to be able to provide
investors with accurate and reliable sustainability reports that they
can use to make informed investment decisions.
A.

Voluntary Sustainability Reporting Does Not
Provide Reliable Information

Without sustainability accounting and reporting standards to
use, companies can just report whatever sustainability information
they want without necessarily any connection to how it affects its
bottom line or how it will address compliance, risks, future plans,
goals, and projects. For example, in Kellogg’s sustainability report
from 2018, it reported that it reduced its energy use by 7.7% and its
93

Id.
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greenhouse emissions by 6.0% from 2017; with a 2020 commitment
to reduce energy use and greenhouse emissions by 15% (from a
2015 baseline).94 It is not clear what effect these reductions will have
on Kellogg’s bottom line—if it is meeting environmental
compliance goals, rules, and regulations, or how it is preparing for
the effects of climate change. Another example of a company that
produces voluntary sustainability reports is Apple. Apple’s
sustainability report discusses how its data centers, which are
located worldwide, produce zero greenhouse gas emissions for their
electricity use.95 Again, it is not clear what this really means from
an investing standpoint. Both of these companies are highlighting
the positive actions and improvements that they are taking, which
does not paint a full picture of their sustainability disclosures and
risks. A limitation of voluntary sustainability reporting is that
companies producing voluntary reports do not always delve further
into what investors would want to know—how these efforts affect
the company’s finances and economic growth.
The Kellogg and Apple examples also highlight how voluntary
sustainability reports tend to have qualitative information presented,
which can be treated quite differently by investors. However, the
SEC has overcome qualitative reporting challenges before. For
example, the SEC created the MD&A and the Compensation and
Disclosures Analysis (“CD&A”) reporting requirements. Under
both these reporting requirements, the SEC provides a principlebased approach to the reporting requirements.96 In my opinion,
through the MD&A and the CD&A, the SEC has proven it can
overcome qualitative reporting challenges. If the SEC works in close
collaboration with existing entities that have been developing
sustainability accounting and reporting standards, investors will
have access to the material information that will help them make
sound investment choices.
94

The Kellogg’s Company, Corporate Responsibility, KELLOGG’S (Dec. 13,
2019), http://crreport.kelloggcompany.com/conserving-natural-resources
95
Apple Inc., Environmental Responsibility Report, APPLE (2018),
https://www.apple.com/environment/pdf/Apple_Environmental_Responsibility_
Report_2018.pdf.
96
Id.
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Voluntary sustainability reporting also raises the problem of
“greenwashing.” Companies motivated by increased profits have
made deceptive, misleading, and false representations, a practice
known as “greenwashing.”97 Therefore, mandating and regulating
sustainability reporting would ensure investors have access to
accurate sustainable disclosures that paint a real picture of a
company’s ESG performance and how that fits into its economic
performance.
B.

Investors Need Uniform Sustainability
Reports

Today, there are numerous98 sustainability accounting and
reporting standards that companies use, making it difficult for
investors and stakeholders to rely on and compare sustainability
reports. This difficulty arises from variables including whether the
standards are U.S. or international based, who the target users are
(i.e. investors or stakeholders generally), whether the standards are
industry specific, and whether the standards are tied to financial
data. Which sustainability accounting and reporting standard a
corporation uses can depend on a variety of factors: where they want
the metric to be presented (i.e., in the MD&A, in a separate
sustainability report, or integrated in the financial reports); what a
company has experience using; whether a specific metric is being
requested by shareholders; or what their competitors are using, to
name a few. This makes it difficult for investors and stakeholders to
compare sustainability reports and sustainable disclosures in
general.

97

Hill v. Roll Internat. Corp., 195 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1298 (2011).
Some sustainability reporting guidelines include the Financial Stability Board's
Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (the “Task Force”)
developed a set of recommendations to facilitate the disclosure of climate change
information.98 Other disclosure metrics and initiatives include: The Climate
Registry (TCR); World Resources Institute (WRI); World Business Council for
Sustainable Development (WBCSD); and Investor Network on Climate Risk
INCR coordinated by CERES.
98
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This strain in consistency can be seen when trying to compare
sustainability reports using different sustainability accounting and
reporting standards. For example, comparing sustainability reports
with one using Global Reporting Initiative (“GRI”) standards99 and
another using Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (“SASB”)
standards.100 In 1997, the GRI101 created a single set of sustainability
reporting guidelines for all businesses, regardless of their size,
sector, or location.102 In contrast, in 2011, the SASB103 identified
sustainability issues that are likely to affect the financial condition
or operating performance of companies within a specific industry104
and is U.S. based.105 Additionally, The GRI metrics focus on
99
Global Reporting Initiative, The Global Standards for Sustainability Reporting,
GRI.ORG (Feb. 8, 2022), https://www.globalreporting.org/standards/ (explaining
on its website that GRI is a reporting standard that creates a common language for
organizations – large or small, private or public – to report on their sustainability
impacts in a consistent and credible way, enhancing global comparability and
enables organizations to be transparent and accountable; the standards help
organizations understand and disclose their impacts in a way that meets the needs
of multiple stakeholders).
100
Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, SASB Standards connect business
and investors on the financial impacts of sustainability, SASB.ORG (Oct.10,
2021), https://www.sasb.org/about/.
101
Global Reporting Initiative, About GRI, GRI.ORG (Oct. 10, 2021),
https://www.globalreporting.org/about-gri/.
102
Global Reporting Initiative, Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, GRI.ORG
(Oct. 10, 2021), https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/grig4-part1reporting-principles-and-standard-disclosures.pdf.
103
Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, SASB Standards Connect Business
and Investors on the Financial Impacts of Sustainability, SASB.ORG (Oct.10,
2021), https://www.sasb.org/about/.
104
Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, SASB Materiality Map,
SASB.ORG (Oct. 9, 2021), https://materiality.sasb.org/materiality.html (showing
that SASB’s materiality map, under the Extract & Minerals Processing Industry
SASB identifies as material environmental issues to include GHG emissions, Air
Quality, energy management, water and wastewater management, waste and
hazardous materials management, and ecological impacts. Whereas, for the
healthcare industry, the material environmental issues include GHG emissions,
energy management, waste and hazardous materials management).
105
Id. (showing SASB uses a materiality map to identify issues that are likely
going to be material to an industry; and therefore, necessary to report on. SASB
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providing information to stakeholders,106 while the SASB metrics
focus on providing information to investors. Because neither GRI
nor SASB are mandated by law, both metrics are used by publicly
traded companies, making it difficult to compare reports in which
one report uses GRI standards and another uses SASB standards.
Protecting investors through reporting requirements will allow for
the comparability aspect of reports, which is something voluntary
reporting lacks.
Integrating sustainable data into financial reports is another
approach to sustainability reporting that further complicates the
comparability aspect of reporting, which I will display by comparing
two different integrated approaches. For example, in 2007, the
Climate Disclosure Standards Board (“CDSB”) narrowed
sustainability reporting to environmental information through an
integrated reporting scheme that aligned disclosure of
environmental information into general corporate financial reports;
it has an international scope.107 Using a similar but slightly different
approach, the International Integrated Reporting Council (“IIRC”),
in 2010, created an integrated reporting metric that
embodies the shared, common interest of a global coalition of
parties in the adoption of Integrated Reporting on an
international basis as a means to improve communication about
value creation, advance the evolution of corporate reporting,
and make a lasting contribution to financial stability and
sustainable development.108

CDSB is limited to environmental information, while IIRC
includes sustainable development more generally. While integrating
identifies 26 sustainability-related business issues, or General Issue Categories,
which encompass a range of Disclosure Topics and their associated Accounting
Metrics that vary by industry).
106
Global Reporting Initiative, About GRI, GRI.ORG (Dec. 13, 2019),
https://www.globalreporting.org/about-gri/.
107
Climate Disclosure Standards Board, About the Climate Disclosure Standards
Board, CDSB.NET (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.cdsb.net/our-story.
108
Value Reporting Foundation, Key to the Development of Integrated Reporting
and Integrated Thinking, INTEGRATED REPORTING (Feb 8, 2022),
https://www.integratedreporting.org/the-iirc-2/structure-of-the-iirc/.
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financial and sustainable reports helps investors see how
sustainability and finance go hand in hand, if not every company
does this it makes it difficult to compare reports using a different
approach. I go through all these different metrics, not to argue that
one is necessarily better or worse than the other, but rather, to show
the need for a set sustainability accounting and reporting standard
that is enforced by the SEC.
Even the sustainability accounting and reporting standard setting
organizations are realizing the need for better guidance and are
paving the path for the SEC to mandate sustainability accounting
and reporting standards. In September 2020, the five leading
sustainability accounting and reporting standard setting
organizations announced109 a “shared vision for a comprehensive
corporate reporting system that includes both financial accounting
and sustainability disclosures, connected via integrated
reporting.”110 On December 20, 2020, these five leading
organizations published a prototype climate-related financial
disclosure standard that illustrates how the concepts can be applied
to climate disclosure and consolidates content and metrics into one
practical guide.111 Their cumulative efforts have been a useful first
step. Now is the time for the SEC to step in using all the accumulated
109
Impact Management Project et al., Statement of Intent to Work Together
Towards Comprehensive Corporate Reporting, IMPACT MANAGEMENT PROJECT
(Sept. 2020), https://29kjwb3armds2g3gi4lq2sx1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wpcontent/uploads/Statement-of-Intent-to-Work-Together-TowardsComprehensive-Corporate-Reporting.pdf.
110
Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, SASB Standards & Other ESG
Frameworks, SASB.ORG (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.sasb.org/about/sasb-andother-esg-frameworks/.
111
Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, Global Sustainability and
Integrated Reporting Organizations Launch Prototype Climate-Related Financial
Disclosure Standard, SASB.ORG (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.sasb.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/12/Press-release-prototype-climate-related-financialdisclosure-standard-Dec20-FINAL.pdf
(explaining how the five leading
organisations (CDP, CDSB, GRI, IIRC, and SASB) in sustainability and
integrated reporting published a shared vision for a comprehensive corporate
reporting system in 2021 and have taken the next step together by publishing a
article that addresses standards for reporting on enterprise value, brought to life
with a prototype climate-related financial disclosure standard).
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experience, research, and public input out there to mandate a
sustainable accounting and reporting standard to be used by
reporting companies.
C.

Investors Need Assurance Sustainability
Reports are Accurate and True

Once sustainability reporting is mandated, auditing of
sustainability reporting ought to be required and regulated under
section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, because it will provide an
extra layer of assurance to investors that the information in which
they are receiving is accurate. In practice, the audit of a
sustainability reports has come to be known as an assurance
statements or assurance letter.
Because sustainability reporting and assurance letters are
unregulated and not uniform, investors can be misled about the
information disclosed and left with minimal information about the
information disclosed.112 This problem is exemplified in
Volkswagen’s assurance letter from 2018. First, Volkswagen’s
assurance letter does not give any detailed disclosures of the nature
of the inquiries that were made or the disclosures that were selected
for analytical evaluation and comparison.113 Second, Volkswagen’s
assurance statement had a disclaimer stating that the audit report “is
not intended for any third parties to base any (financial) decision
thereon. Our responsibility lies only with the Company. We do not
assume any responsibility towards third parties.”114 The
independent assurer’s letter is not designed for Volkswagen
investors; it is an assurance letter for Volkswagen itself to relieve it
of liability.115 This defeats the whole purpose of having a third party
112

Po-Chang Chen, et al., Sustainability Assurance’s Link to Reporting Quality,
OF
ACCOUNTANCY
(Oct.
10,
2019),
https://www.journalof
J.
accountancy.com/news/2019/oct/sustainability-assurance-link-to-reportingquality-201919354.html.
113
Michael Kraten, Sustainability Reports and the Limitations of ‘Limited’
Assurance, THE CPA J. (Jul. 2019), https://www.cpajournal.com
/2019/07/26/sustainability-reports-and-the-limitations-of-limited-assurance/.
114
Id.
115
Id.
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audit the sustainability report if the readers of the report cannot rely
on the information provided in the assurance letter. This evidences
that voluntary sustainability reporting and auditing/assurance efforts
are not sufficient; investors and shareholders need sustainability
reporting, including the auditing/assurance aspect, to be mandated
and regulated by the SEC so that they can rely on accurate and
reliable information to make investment decisions.
Another issue is raised when trying to compare assurance reports
confirming sustainability reports of different companies. For
example, when comparing the Volkswagen’s assurance report from
2018 to the Fiat Chrysler Automobiles independent assurance report
from 2018. Because these two assurance letters detail and confirm
different information, it makes it difficult for investors and
stakeholders to compare reports sufficiently.116 This, in turn, strains
the ability of investors and shareholders to make comparisons of
companies before investing, highlighting the need for the SEC to
mandate and regulated sustainability accounting and standards used
for reporting and auditing.
D.

The SEC’s Limited Guidance on
Sustainability Reporting Does Not Protect
Investors

Since the 1960s, stakeholders, including investors, have been
trying to use securities law to increase corporate sustainability
disclosure.117 In the past the SEC has been resistant to the idea of
regulating sustainable disclosures. This is evidenced by the 1977
report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure, led by
former SEC Commissioner Sommer (“The Sommer Report”).118
The Sommer Report concluded that the SEC “should not try to use
its powers to compel disclosure concerning, for instance, social or

116

Id.
See generally Fisch, supra note 90 (explaining various social and political
groups to use the securities laws to obtain greater corporate sustainability
disclosure began in the 1960s).
118
Id. at 934-35
117
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environmental matters, hiring practices, and the like, unless it could
be shown that such matters were material to investors.”119
Likely to Sommer’s surprise, investors have been pushing the
SEC to issue guidance regarding the information contained in a
sustainability report, which evidences that investors are already
indicating that they think some of sustainability reporting is
“material.” In 2007, institutional investors petitioned the SEC to
issue guidance on climate change disclosures.120 The petition
explained that “the risks and opportunities many corporations face
in connection with climate change fall within the category
of material information that is required to be analyzed and disclosed
in many corporate filings.”
In 2010, in response to the institutional investors,121 the SEC
issued guidance on climate change disclosures.122 In the 2010
guidance, the SEC advised issuers that they could include climate
risks and were required to disclose material information about their
exposure to risks resulting from climate change.123 The SEC said
this requirement to disclose material information regarding climate
change stemmed from provisions of Regulation S-K,124 including
disclosures in the MD&A, disclosure about legal proceedings, or
disclosures about risk factors.125 The 2010 guidance fell short
because the SEC did not implement or enforce an adequate and

119

Advisory Comm. On Corp. Disclosure, 95th Cong., Rep. To The Sec. and Exch.
Comm’n 391-99 (Comm. Print 1977).
120
Fisch, supra note 90 at 956.
121
Id.
122
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related
to Climate Change, Release No. 82 (Feb. 2, 2010).
123
Fisch, supra note 90, at 937.
124
17 C.F.R. § 229.10 (2010) (prescribing that regulation S-K lists the reporting
requirements for SEC filings by pubic companies, including requirements
applicable to the content of the non-financial statement portions).
125
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related
to Climate Change, Release No. 82 (Feb. 2, 2010).
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consistent set of requirements.126 Since sustainability reporting was
not mandated, the disclosure qualities have been criticized.127
SEC enforcement of this guidance has been limited.128 There
are perhaps a few reasons for this. One being that
agency's staff guidance is
“nonbinding”
and
without
“enforceable legal rights or obligations.”129 However, the guidance
does not purport any new information; rather, it reiterates already
existing law about reporting on material information. To this latter
point, the SEC may be resisting enforcement as a way to prevent
disclosure overload, due to its lack of resources to enforce, or to stay
out of the political division about climate change.130 The lack of
standardized reporting frameworks also makes it difficult to enforce
because there is no standard to go off of.
In 2016, the SEC issued a Concept Release,131 where it received
thousands of comments about the importance of sustainability
disclosures for shareholder investment and voting decisions.132 In
response, investors are indicating the materiality of sustainability
disclosures by requesting that the SEC “require annual, uniform
sustainability reporting from public companies as part of the
overhaul of the agency's disclosure regime.”133 The SEC has not
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acted on the request yet.134 Just a few months ago, on March 15,
2021, in light of demand for climate change information and
questions about whether current disclosures adequately inform
investors, Acting Chair Allison Herren Lee requested public input
from investors, registrants, and other market participants on climate
change disclosure. The deadline to submit comments is June 2021,
which was after the completion of this article.
It is time for the SEC to make its next move in ensuring that
investors have access to material information: that is through
mandating and regulating sustainability reporting.
3.

Summary

The SEC’s function is to protect investors. However, the
minimal SEC guidance is not enough to push voluntary
sustainability reporting where it needs to be to protect investors by
providing them with adequate and reliable sustainable disclosures.
The SEC mandate and regulation of sustainability reporting will fill
in the gaps. This next step makes sense especially due to the fact that
the SEC directive of sustainability reporting fits under the existing
securities law. Using its authority under securities law, the SEC can
impose uniform sustainability accounting and reporting standards,
require auditing obligations, and bring enforcement actions against
violators. Additionally, the SEC should mandate sustainability
reporting because sustainability reporting concerns, issues, and risks
fall under the definition of “material” information, as evidenced by
the fact that investors are requesting this information from the SEC
itself. In part II of this article, I discuss other ways that investors and
shareholders have been indicating that sustainable disclosures are
material to them.

134

Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Release No. 33-10064: Bus. & Fin. Disclosure
(Apr.
13,
2016),
Required
by
Regulation
S-K,
SEC.GOV
https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2016/33-10064.pdf.
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SHAREHOLDERS ARE DEMANDING ACCURATE AND
RELIABLE SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING

Shareholders and investors have not only been turning to the
SEC to ensure they receive reliable and accurate sustainable
disclosures, but they have also been pushing for this information at
the judicial and corporate levels. Because investors are attempting
to access sustainable disclosures through shareholder litigation and
shareholder proposals, this section reveals that this information is in
fact material to investors. Therefore, SEC mandate and regulation
of sustainability reporting would support its mission of maintaining
fair orderly and efficient markets135 because litigation and proposals
can be costly, take up a lot of time, and take up a lot of a company’s
resources.
In section A below, I analyze two shareholder securities fraud
cases regarding climate disclosures brought by shareholders against
two of the largest companies in the energy industry, Exxon Mobil
and PG&E. Shareholders may bring a securities fraud lawsuit if they
have suffered financial losses resulting from purchasing shares in a
company during a period of time when fraud or securities law
violations inflated the value of the stock.136 This is known as a 10(b)(5) claim.137 The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(“PSLRA”) made the pleading requirements more difficult for a
135

See Fera, supra note 37.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 ( “[T]he law regarding securities fraud lawsuits states
that it shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange, (a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud, (b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) to engage in
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security”).
137
Id.; Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 157
(2008) (explaining that the following elements need to be met in order to bring a
10-(b)(5) claim: 1) a material misrepresentation (or omission); 2) scienter, i.e., a
wrongful state of mind; 3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security; 4)
reliance; 5) economic loss; and 6) loss causation).
136
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plaintiff to bring a securities fraud claim due to plaintiffs bringing
claims in hopes of revealing securities fraud, without necessarily
having a suspicion that there was any securities fraud in the first
place.138 Despite the increased difficulty, these types of lawsuits are
still being brought.
In Section B below, I discuss shareholder proposals requesting
a company’s sustainable disclosures. Shareholders that meet a
statutory requirement are able to bring shareholder proposals.139
Because a shareholder proposal is nonbinding, its force comes from
the fact that it is included in the issuer’s proxy statement,140 which
can put pressure on a company to take certain action. A proxy
statement is a public document141 required by the SEC to be
delivered to shareholders of publicly held corporations that alerts
shareholders of meetings, discloses issues that will be discussed, and
discloses all important facts about the issues on which shareholders
are asked to vote.142 Shareholders have been using shareholder
138

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (prescribing that a plaintiff must “specify each
statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the
statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission
is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all
facts on which that belief is formed”).
139
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (prescribing that a shareholder must have continuously
held at least $2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the company's securities entitled to
be voted on the proposal at the meeting for at least one year by the date they
submit the proposal and must continue to hold those securities through the date of
the meeting in order to be eligible to submit a proposal).
140
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Proxy Statement, SEC.GOV (Sept. 8, 2011),
https://www.sec.gov/answers/proxy.htm (stating that the SEC requires that
shareholders of a public company receive a proxy statement prior to a shareholder
meeting and the information contained in the statement must be filed with the SEC
before soliciting a shareholder vote on the election of directors and the approval
of other corporate action; solicitations must disclose all important facts about the
issues on which shareholders will vote).
141
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8; see also Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Proxy Sstatements:
How
to
Find
(April
2022),
INVESTOR.GOV,
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/proxy
-statements-how-find (explaining that companies are required to file their proxy
statements using the SEC's public database, known as EDGAR).
142
US Legal, Proxy statement law and legal definition, USLEGAL.COM (Feb. 8,
2022), https://definitions.uslegal.com/p/proxy-statement/.
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proposals as a way to access and make public sustainable
information, including which directors have environmental
experience, a company’s energy uses, how companies are dealing
with environmental risks, and the effects of climate change on
capital, because they find this information material to their
investment decisions.143
Shareholder litigation and shareholder proposals can be tools to
incentivize companies to present accurate information about and to
improve their sustainable practices. For example, the costs and the
effects on a company’s reputation from shareholder securities fraud
lawsuits can negatively affect a company’s stock value. In order to
avoid these high risks, companies are incentivized to be transparent
and have good sustainable practices from the start. Shareholder
proposals can have a dramatic influence on a company's sustainable
practices even if they do not pass, because sometimes companies
will agree to take action in exchange for withdrawal of proposals
that they do not want to be public.144 However, mandating
sustainability reporting would be a more efficient and way to ensure
transparency and a productive market that protects investors. To be
in line with its mission statement, the SEC should mandate, regulate,
and enforce penalties for violations of sustainability reporting.
1.

Shareholder Litigation

Shareholder litigation can be an extremely expensive and timeconsuming way for shareholders to protect themselves from
misleading and fraudulent information. The securities fraud claims
brought against Exxon regarding fraudulent climate disclosures has
cost Exxon Mobil’s shareholders between $476 million and $1.6

143

Cristina Banahan, Doubling Down on Two-Degrees: The Rise in Support for
Climate Risk Proposals, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 23,
2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/23/doubling-down-on-twodegrees-the-rise-in-support-for-climate-risk-proposals/#more-104394.
144
Maya Mueller, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: Cracker Barrel, Institutional
Investors, and the 1998 Amendments, 28 STETSON L. REV. 451, 458–59 (1998)
(explaining that sometimes management will concede to shareholders in return
for the withdrawal of a proposal).
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billion.145 The securities fraud claims brought against PG&E
regarding false and misleading statements about compliance with
safety regulations regarding electricity transmissions, state laws,
and potential to cause wildfires in California has cost PG&E billions
of dollars causing PG&E to file bankruptcy.146 For the shareholders,
this means that they could keep losing out on dividends147 and create
a volatile price of the stock.148 Mandating and regulating
sustainability reporting would be a more efficient way to protect
investors being defrauded by misleading sustainable disclosures.
A.

Exxon Shareholder Litigation

On November 11, 2016, an Exxon investor filed a securities
class action against Exxon for failure to disclose climate risks. The
plaintiffs in this lawsuit alleged that Exxon deliberately misled
investors regarding the impact of climate change on the company's
operations and valuation.149 The initial complaint alleged that Exxon
made materially false and misleading public statements because it
did not disclose that Exxon’s internally generated reports
concerning climate change recognized the environmental risks
associated with climate change—specifically that Exxon would not

145

John Schwartz, Fossil Fuels on Trial: New York’s Lawsuit Against Exxon
Begins, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
10/22/climate/new-york-lawsuit-exxon.html.
146
Sammy Roth, Meet the new PG&E. It looks a lot like the old PG&E, L.A.
TIMES (June 17, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/environment/story/2020-0617/pge-bankruptcy-new-pge-looks-like-old-pge (explaining that PG&E filed for
bankruptcy protection in January 2019 to shield itself from tens of billions of
dollars in potential fire liabilities).
147
Id. (Looking to the 2001 bankruptcy, in which investors lost out on
approximately $1.7 billion in dividends.)
148
Id. (Summarizing that the price PG&E's stock went up more than 2 percent the
day the filing was announced; then the stock price plummeted to a little more than
$5 in early January; and then it traded at more than $47 in November, before
details emerged about the utility's potential role in the latest wildfires).
149
Complaint at 1, Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 334 F. Supp. 3d 832 (N.D. Tex.
2018) (No. 3:16-cv-3111).
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be able to extract the hydrocarbon reserves it asserted to have.150
Additionally, the complaint alleged that Exxon had been employing
an inaccurate price of carbon to calculate the value of certain future
oil and gas prospects.151 As a result of statements Exxon made
during the plaintiff’s class period,152 the common stock price was
artificially inflated, and Exxon’s release of its third quarter financial
results on October 28, 2016, in which it disclosed it might have to
write down 20% of its oil and gas assets, resulted in the stock price
falling by more than $2 per share.153
Additionally, in July 2017, a consolidated complaint was filed
as a class action, which included similar claims but by additional
shareholders who traded stock between March 31, 2014, and
January 30, 2017.154 On August 14, 2018, the court ruled that
investors had adequately pleaded the claims that Exxon and Exxon
officials made material misstatements concerning the company’s
use of proxy costs for carbon in business and investment
decisions.155 This litigation is still on going as of October 20,
2020.156
This Exxon shareholder litigation about Exxon’s failure to report
accurate climate disclosures evidences that investors find climate
disclosures material because it affects the value of their stock.
Manipulation of stock prices is what the Exchange Act aims to
150

Complaint at 2, Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 334 F. Supp. 3d 832 (N.D. Tex.
2018) (No. 3:16-cv-3111).
151
Complaint at 8, Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 334 F. Supp. 3d 832 (N.D. Tex.
2018) (No. 3:16-cv-3111).
152
Joel C. Haims & Ruti Smithline, Accountant’s Liability for Securities, 16 BUS.
L. TODAY 53 (2007) (exemplifying through a lawsuit analysis that the class period
is the time when the fraud inflated the value of the stock).
153
Complaint at 3, Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 334 F. Supp. 3d (N.D. Tex.
2018) (No. 3:16-cv-3111).
154
Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 334 F. Supp. 3d 832, 859 (N.D. Tex. 2018)
(No. 3:16-cv-0311).
155
Id.
156
Climate Case Chart, Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp.—Climate Change
(2016),
Litigation, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW
http://climatecasechart.com/case/ramirez-v-exxon-mobil-corp/?mc_cid=4f18cda
b05&mc_eid=[054c56d010.
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prevent.157 SEC regulation of sustainability reporting, which
includes the climate disclosures at issue in this Exxon shareholder
litigation, would be in line with securities law because it would help
ensure investors have material information and prevent
manipulation of stock prices. While only speculative, had
sustainability reporting been mandated and regulated, perhaps
Exxon would have publicly disclosed what it had discovered in its
internal reports because environmental risks associated with climate
change—specifically that Exxon would not be able to extract
hydrocarbon reserves it asserted to have—is the type of material
information that a sustainability report would include.
B.

PG&E Shareholder Litigation

The 2018 and 2019 shareholder litigation cases against PG&E
provide another example of investors finding sustainable disclosures
material because it affects their investments. In these shareholder
litigation cases against PG&E, the plaintiffs requested
compensatory damages for the damages they have endured as a
result of PG&E’s wrongdoing to be determined at a jury trial.158
In June 2018, the plaintiff shareholders in Weston v. PG&E
Corp. file suit against PG&E.159 This is a federal securities class
action on behalf of all investors who purchased or otherwise

157

Fera, supra note 37 (explaining how the Exchange Act regulates market
participants, including large public issuers, institutional investment managers,
underwriters, broker-dealers, exchanges, transfer agents, and securities clearing
agencies in part to protect against stock price manipulation).
158
Complaint at 21, Weston v. PG&E, 2018 WL 2948088 (N.D. Cal.); see also
Complaint at 46, York Cnty. v. Rambo, 2019 WL 917281 (N.D. Cal.) (No. 3:19cv-00994-RS).
159
Pacific Gas & Electric Company, Joint Notice of 2019 Annual Meetings Joint
Proxy
Statement,
PG&E
CORPORATION,
at
104,
(2019),
https://s1.q4cdn.com/880135780/files/doc_financials/2019/05/2019-ProxyStatement-final-web-ready.pdf [Hereinafter PG&E Joint Notice] (summarizing
the wildfire-related securities class action litigation against the company,
including another case Jon Paul Moretti v. PG&E Corporation, et al. in which
similar claims as the Weston case were raised).
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acquired PG&E common stock between the Class Period.160 In the
complaint, the shareholders asserted that:
Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) PG&E had
failed to maintain electricity transmission and distribution
networks in compliance with safety requirements and
regulations promulgated under state law; (ii) consequently,
PG&E was in violation of state law regulation; (iii)
PG&E’s electricity networks would cause numerous
wildfires in California; and (iv) as a result of the foregoing,
Defendants’ statements about the Company’s business and
operations were materially false and misleading at all
relevant times.161

Due to the commencement of the Bankruptcy, PG&E
Corporation and the Utility filed a notice on February 1, 2019,
reflecting that the proceedings are automatically stayed pursuant to
Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.162
Another case was filed against PG&E on February 22, 2019.163
At the time this new suit was filed, PG&E had declared bankruptcy
twenty some days earlier from a batch of criminal proceedings,
regulatory investigations, and civil lawsuits—which cost PG&E an
estimated $30 billion.164 Because of the bankruptcy, the new case
was brought against PG&Es officers and directors by the
underwriters of the notes offerings, PG&E, and bond investors.165
Their complaint stated that PG&E had lax wildfire safety practices,
and from June 2014 through December 2017, PG&E equipment was
160

Complaint at 1, Weston v. PG&E, 2018 WL 2948088 (N.D.Cal.) (No. 3:18-cv03509).
161
Complaint at 6, Weston v. PG&E Corp., 2018 WL 2948088 (N.D.Cal. 2018)
(No. 3:18-cv-03509).
162
See PG&E Joint Notice, supra note 159, at 104.
163
Pacific Gas & Electric Company, 2020 Joint Annual Report to Shareholders,
PG&E
CORPORATION,
at
185
(2020),
https://s1.q4cdn.com/
880135780/files/doc_financials/2020/ar/PCG012AR_2020_AR_Web.pdf.
164
Complaint at 10, York County v. Rambo, 2019 WL 917281 (N.D.Cal.) (No.
3:19-cv-00994-RS).
165
Complaint at 3, York County v. Rambo, 2019 WL 917281 (N.D.Cal.) (No. 3:19cv-00994-RS).
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found to have caused over 1,500 fires across almost the entirety of
the Company’s service area.166
PG&E continues to face more shareholder lawsuits asserting
that PG&E made false and misleading statements about its safety
practices, including active concealment of numerous and
widespread violations of California safety regulations.167 On May 7,
2019, the District Court granted a consolidation of the York County
Action with In re PG&E Corporation Securities Litigation.168 These
consolidated cases are still on going as of October 4, 2019, when the
officer, director, and underwriter defendants filed motions to
dismiss.169 The motion to dismiss is still under submission with the
Court.170 The securities actions are to be resolved by the Bankruptcy
Court as part of the claims reconciliation process in the Chapter 11
Cases.171
In all, the numerous cases against PG&E reflect the importance
of having accurate and reliable sustainable disclosures. Shareholder
litigation is an inefficient way to obtain climate information because
it is so costly and time consuming. ESG performance disclosures
reported on in a sustainability report include compliance with safety
requirements and regulations under state law as well as
environmental risks like wildfires. Therefore, I assert that mandating
and regulating sustainability reporting could potentially prevent or,
at least, minimize this type of shareholder litigation because
companies would already be required to disclose this information.
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Complaint at 41, York County v. Rambo, 2019 WL 917281 (N.D.Cal.) (No.
3:19-cv-00994-RS).
167
Labaton Sucharow, In re G&E Corporation Securities Litigation,
LABATON.COM (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.labaton.com/cases/in-re-pgecorporation-securities-litigation#:~:text=On%20January%2029%2C%202019%
2C%20the,%2C%20directors%2C%20and%20underwriters.
168
PG&E Joint Notice, supra note 159, at 104.
169
Id.
170
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Id.
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Shareholder Proposals

Another example of shareholder action to get the material
information about sustainable disclosures that they need to make
informed investment decisions is through shareholder proposals.
The examples of shareholder proposals in this section show that
investors are interested in a company’s sustainable disclosures—the
environmental risks and the connection between a company’s long
term shareholder value and climate change. In this section, I will
summarize shareholder proposals regarding sustainability.
A.

Shareholder Proposal About Sustainable
Disclosures

Climate-related proposals fall into two categories: calls for the
company to disclose climate-related risks (including the risks
associated with a rapid global transition to clean energy sources) or
calls to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions.172 Shareholder
proposals typically concentrate on seeking sustainability disclosure
and oversight, rather than attempting to cause the company to adopt
specific sustainability policies.173
The shareholders of Caterpillar, Conoco Phillips, Cummins,
Gillette, Nexen, Occidental Petro-Canada, Reebok, and Staples
asserted in a proposal that the board of directors and managers had
a fiduciary duty to become informed, and to inform shareholders,
about potential climate change risks and opportunities.174 Other
types of climate change proposals include: requests for review of
proxy guidelines; nomination of directors with environmental
experience; increase of return on capital in light climate change

172

Jonathan M. Gilligan, Carrots and Sticks in Private Climate Governance, 6
TEX. A&M L. REV. 179, 192 (2018).
173
Fisch, supra note 90.
174
Perry E. Wallace, Climate Change, Fiduciary Duty, and Corporate Disclosure:
Are Things Heating up in the Boardroom?, 26 VA. ENV’T. L.J. 293, 322 (2008).
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risks; GHG Emission Goals; Renewable Energy goals; and Methane
emission goals.175
The shareholders from PPL Corporation, Exxon, and Occidental
Petroleum requested a “2-degree scenario analysis” in a proposal,
which refers to the goal of the Paris Climate Accord of limiting
global temperature increases to 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees
Fahrenheit).176 These proposals won with at least a majority support.
The shareholder proposal for Occidental petroleum was approved
with a two-thirds vote, the PPL proposal was approved with a 57%
vote for, and the ExxonMobil proposal passed with 62% for. This
means that the requested information will need to be disclosed.
However, in April 2019 the SEC held in favor of Exxon’s request to
strike down the shareholder proposal, concluding that it agreed with
Exxon’s claim that the proposal constituted “micromanagement” of
the company in violation of Rule 14(a)(8).177
The sustainability accounting and reporting standards developed
by industry professionals includes the type of information being
requested in these shareholder proposals. Therefore, mandating and
regulating sustainability accounting and reporting standards would
protect investors more efficiently because it would provide them
with the accurate and reliable information that they are attempting
to obtain through the shareholder proposals.
3.

Summary

Shareholder litigation and proposals reveal that investors find
sustainability disclosures material and clearly evidences that they
175

Cristina Banahan, Doubling Down on Two-Degrees: The Rise in Support for
Climate Risk Proposals, ISS CORPORATE SOLUTIONS (Jan. 23, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/23/doubling-down-on-two-degreesthe-rise-in-support-for-climate-risk-proposals/#more-104394.
176
Cydney Posner, Are Shareholder Proposals on Climate Change Becoming a
Thing?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 21, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/06/21/are-shareholder-proposals-onclimate-change-becoming-a-thing/.
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See Alyson Clabaugh, SEC Backs Exxon on Climate Change Proposal,
INTELLIGIZE (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.intelligize.com/sec-backs-exxon-onclimate-change-proposal/.
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are not gaining access to accurate and reliable sustainable
disclosures through voluntary sustainability reporting. This further
supports that sustainability reporting should be mandated and
regulated by the SEC. The SEC can look to shareholder proposals
about sustainable disclosures as a guide to what exactly investors
think is material.
III. PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENT FOR MANDATING SUSTAINABILITY
REPORTING
Because sustainability reporting has only recently been widely
adopted across the globe, there is limited research on how effective
it is in contributing to climate change mitigation.178 A recent study
of the literature on climate accounting concluded that “a greater
concentration should be invested on the concrete effects produced
by climate change related practices on the sustainability
performances of [accounting] firms.”179
I purport that government mandate and regulation of
sustainability reporting could incentivize companies to be more
sustainable and climate conscious since they would be required to
disclose sustainable information—the good, the bad, and the ugly.
Because companies would not want to report sustainable disclosures
that damage their reputation, mandating sustainability reporting
could have the effect of making companies more sustainable. This,
in turn, can have the effect of contributing to climate change
mitigation.
What is clear, is the connection between climate change and
sustainable development.180 The U.S. shift to clean energy is
happening. Corporations will be forced to adapt and transition to
more sustainable practices. I can only hope that the United Nations
definition of sustainability will come to fruition, that the “needs of

178

Carmela Gulluscio et al., Climate Change Accounting and Reporting: A
Systematic Literature Review, 12 SUSTAINABILITY 1, 20 (2020) (explaining that
climate change accounting-related literature is not very widespread).
179
Id.
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the present [will be met] without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs.”181
IV.

CONCLUSION

In the wake of numerous financial disasters, securities laws have
been developed and amended to ensure investors have access to
accurate, reliable, and trustworthy information about publicly traded
companies to facilitate their sound investment decisions. Mandating
and regulating sustainability reporting is in line with this paradigm
of securities law and fits into the existing legal regime.
Industry professionals, reporting companies, and investors have
all done their part to take sustainability reporting as far as it can go.
Industry professionals have come together to create sustainability
accounting and reporting standards. Reporting companies have been
engaging in voluntary sustainability reporting of some sort since the
1980s. Investors have shown that they find sustainability disclosure
material, by way of petitioning the SEC, shareholder litigation, and
shareholder proposals. The missing piece to the puzzle is SEC
mandate and regulation.182
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See United Nations, Sustainability, UN.ORG (Feb. 8,
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